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‘YOU CAN COUNT ON US’: 
WHEN MALIAN DIPLOMACY 
STRATCOMMED UNCLE SAM 
AND THE ROLE OF IDENTITY 
IN COMMUNICATION
Pablo de Orellana
How did North African states depict their nomadic minorities to the US during the 
War on Terror in the 2000s? How did this shape American policy in the region? 
Focusing on Malian-American diplomacy and drawing on post-structuralist analytics 
of  identity-formation, this paper first examines how Malian diplomacy represented 
nomadic minorities in communication with US diplomatic and military envoys during 
the period 2002–2010. It is found that Mali consistently branded Saharan nomads as 
lawless subjects that make territory ungovernable, compromise security, and facilitate 
terrorism. Second, this paper deploys intertextual analysis to measure the success of  
these strategic communications efforts. It is found that, despite the advice of  some 
American diplomats on the ground, by the end of  2008 Mali’s depiction of  Saharan 
nomadism had been absorbed into US diplomacy. This subsumed Northern Malian 
subjects into the categories of  the War on Terror, which privileged military control 
of  subjects and territory over development and reconciliation efforts. This policy 
shift granted Mali influence over US policy and diplomatic support to ignore nomadic 
grievances. Analysis reveals the key role of  identity-making and name-calling in Mali-US 
relations and in diplomatic communication more broadly, showcasing the potential of  
textual analysis methods to evaluate strategic communications outcomes.
Keywords: counterterrorism, identity, North Africa, diplomacy, Tuareg, Mali, strategic 
communication, strategic communications
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Introductory démarches
Diplomatic communication was deeply involved in achieving a key shift in US policy 
towards counterterrorism and security in North Africa. In the early 2000s, US policy 
anticipated countering extremism in the Sahara through social, human rights, and 
economic development. By late 2008, however, though nearly imperceptibly, policy had 
changed to the opposite approach, one seeking control of  these same subjects and 
territory before addressing their pressing grievances. This policy shift was predicated 
on depicting the Tuareg as ‘terror-enabling bandits’, a depiction which had long been 
promoted by Malian diplomacy. 
In the early 2000s US policy was concerned that the Western Sahel could provide safe 
haven for Islamic terrorism,1 particularly after the Algerian Civil war when the remnants 
of  Islamist forces found refuge in the porous borderlands between Algeria, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, and Libya.2 US diplomats agreed that counterterrorism in the Sahel 
depended on successfully addressing the grievances of  Tuareg and Arab minorities in 
the north of  Mali, who had staged major rebellions in the 1960s and 1990s.3 Initial 
responses, the Pan-Sahel Initiative (2002–2004) and its successor the Trans-Saharan 
Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), sought to provide resilience to terrorism rather 
than combat it, and were led by the State Department and US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) with Department of  Defense (DoD) support.4 The initiative 
was framed in the context of  the Millennium Development Goals and managed various 
funding streams to address development problems and grievances fuelling radicalisation, 
and to promote human rights, democratic governance, and improved gender and ethnic 
1 See for instance ‘Statement from Senator Coons on Situation in Mali’, 22 March 2012.; Lawrence Cline, 
‘Counterterrorism Strategy in the Sahel’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism , Ȳ 1 1 September , 
889–899.
2 Rear Admiral Hamlin Tallent testimony before the House International Relations Committee Subcom-
mittee on International Terrorism and Non-Proliferation (10 March 2005). Cited in Lianne K. Boudali, 
The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,,(The Combating Terrorism Center, West Point US Military 
Academy, April 2007), 1.
3 6/3/2008, BAMAKO239. Wikileaks documents cited by date and original State Department reference 
number.
4 Bray, F. J., The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership: Strategy and Institutional Friction, (Carlisle Barracks, 
Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 22 March 2011).
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relations.5 Mali did almost nothing to implement this development-based approach or 
reconciliation in the north of  the country.6
North African postcolonial states have long had problems in integrating and governing 
nomadic minorities. Bound by the borders drawn up by European colonial convenience, 
the ancient peoples of  the Sahara—the Tuareg and other Berbers such as the Kabyle 
or Moroccan Amazigh, and Arabised Berbers such as the Sahrawi, Berabiche, and 
Moors—are now divided among Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Mauritania, Niger, and Mali. 
In the Middle Ages, ever-shifting tribal federations drove Islamic expansion in North 
Africa and Al-Andalus, though then and now these federations have been temporary 
and fragile.7 Colonial division of  the Sahara challenged the very feasibility of  their social 
and economic existence, and upon independence from France in 19, the Tuareg and 
other nomadic and semi-nomadic minorities were divided into northern Mali, southern 
Algeria, and Libya. While Algeria and Libya were able to co-opt—and occasionally 
coerce—Tuaregs into an apparently sustainable, if  strained, status quo, Mali and Niger 
have long sought either to ignore them or to control them militarily. In Mali and Niger 
the Tuareg rose in arms against the Malian state in 1962, 1990, 2006, and 2012, and 
against Niger in . 5ebellions drew on existing and, crucially, ever-shifting systems 
of  alliances,8 while even the very definition of  Tuareg identity varied. The uprisings 
were fuelled by urgent economic, social, environmental, and military grievances, and 
5 Boudali, The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.
6 Pezard, Stephanie and Michael Shurkin, Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, 
and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), p. 41.
 See Guichaoua,<van, ‘Circumstantial Alliances and Loose Loyalties in 5ebellion Making The Case of  
Tuareg Insurgency in Northern Niger (2007–2009)’, in Understanding Collective Political Violence, (N.P.: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 1, 4²  Guichaoua,<van ed., Understanding Collective Political Violence, (Hound-
mills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Baz Lecocq et al., ‘One Hippopota-
mus and Eight Blind Analysts: A Multivocal Analysis of  the 2012 Political Crisis in the Divided Republic 
of  Mali’, Review of  African Political Economy 4, Ȳ 1 1 September 1, 4² Lecocq, Baz and 
Jean Sebastian Lecocq, Disputed Desert : Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern 
Mali, (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 433.
8 See the major debate of  the 1990s between Bourgeot and Hélène Claudot-Hawad on Tuareg identity 
and social structure and its modern and late modern development, especially Bourgeot, André, ‘Identité 
Touarègue: De l’aristocratie à La Révolution’, Études Rurales Ȳ 1 199, 19²1 ‘Le Corps Touareg 
Désarticulé Ou l’impensé Politique (The Disjointed Tuareg Body, or Political Unimagination)’, Cahiers 
d’Études Africaines 4, Ȳ 1 1994, 9²1 ‘5pvoltes et 5pbellions En Pays Touareg’, Afrique Contem-
poraine Ȳ 1 1994, ²19 ‘Les 5pbellions Touarqgues Une Cause Perdue"’, Afrique Contemporaine Ȳ 
180 (1996), 99–115; Hélène Claudot-Hawad, Les Touaregs. Portrait En Fragments (Edisud, 1993); ‘Identité 
et altérité d’un point de vue touareg’ (1996), 7–16; ‘La Hiérarchie Des Savoirs et Des Pouvoirs Dans La 
Sociptp Touarqgue Prpcoloniale et La 5ecomposition Des 5{les Socio-Politiques Pendant La Guerre 
Anticoloniale et Après La Défaite’, Nomadic Peoples , Ȳ 1 199, 1²‘A Nomadic Fight against Im-
mobility : The Tuareg in the Modern State’, in Nomadic Societies in The Middle East and North Africa: Entering 
the 21st Century, ed. D. Chatty (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 654–681; Hélène Claudot-Hawad et al., Touaregs. Exil et 
Résistance, ed. Hplqne Claudot-Hawad Aix-en-Provence Edisud, 199.
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their lack of  influence over the states in which they reside9 most of  them resulted in 
repression by Mali and Niger, frequently supported by the French. Droughts in the 
19s and 19s, and the conflicts themselves, drove many into exile in Algeria as well 
as Gaddafi’s Libya, their only state protector.10 The US policy of  ending this cycle of  
crushing poverty, violence, exile, and rebellion through social, political, and economic 
development was extremely sensible. 
By late , however, US counterterrorism policy in the Sahel had become significantly 
militarised and security-led.11 It moved from addressing lack of  development, 
infrastructure, human rights, political representation, and services, towards a military-
to-military partnerships approach.12 The shift was most evident when core channels 
of  funding, policy, and implementation became military-led. It would appear that the 
understanding of  the problem of  extremism in North Africa, and the means available 
to counter it, were themselves consequently subsumed into a military approach to 
counterterrorism. Crucially, this shift ended US pressure on Mali to implement the 
Algiers Accords of  4 -uly  as a way to counter extremism. The Accords, which 
had ended the brief  Tuareg rebellion of  2006, included redress of  Tuareg grievances 
regarding social, political, and human rights, as well as mixed Malian-Tuareg military 
units, and economic development in northern Mali. 
Throughout 2006–2008, the Malian government had only one position on 
counterterrorism in the Sahel: military control of  territory and subjects. The government 
led by President Amadou Toumani Touré (also known as ATT) spent most of  the 
2000s requesting increased American military aid, arguing that the criminality and 
ungovernability of  these nomads prevented successful counterterrorism efforts, and that 
only military control of  space and people could deny al-Qaeda space. Contemporarily, 
Touré and Malian diplomats continuously rejected or heroically avoided US pressure to 
prevent extremism through economic development and the resolution of  longstanding 
grievances.13 Instead, Touré’s administration relied on the so-called ‘ATT Consensus’ 
approach, which sought to keep the presidency above party politics (ATT himself  ran 
9 See also Guichaoua, ‘Circumstantial Alliances and Loose Loyalties in 5ebellion Making’ 5osa De -orio, 
‘Narratives of  the Nation and Democracy in Mali’, Cahiers d’études Africaines Ȳ 1 1 September , 
827–856.
10 Bourgeot, ‘Révoltes et Rébellions En Pays Touareg’; Ronen, Yehudit, ‘Libya, the Tuareg and Mali on 
the Eve of  the “Arab Spring” and in Its Aftermath: An Anatomy of  Changed Relations’, The Journal of  
North African Studies 1, Ȳ 4 1 September 1, 1.
11 Zoubir, Yahia H., ‘The United States and Maghreb–Sahel Security’, International Affairs , Ȳ  1 
September 2009), 993.
1 Gutelius, David, ‘Islam in Northern Mali and the War on Terror’, Journal of  Contemporary African Studies 
, Ȳ 1 , 9².
13 See 19/6/2007, 07BAMAKO676.
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as an independent) by forging links with individuals across political, civil, and military 
spheres.14 In its latter days, this approach came to depend entirely on patronage, in some 
ways privatising the state into unofficial networks, which vastly increased corruption, 
alienating those outside the ruling coalition; these outsiders were left feeling voiceless, 
and their faith in democracy and republican institutions was undermined.15 In the 
north of  the country, this approach relied on coopting loyal northerners and exploiting 
longstanding divisions among tribes, strata and castes within tribes, and feuds. Some, 
such as the Berabiche and some subaltern Tuareg groups, allied with the government 
to keep rebels in check, while others, such as the Ifoghas, became the targets of  greater 
military control. Key brokers and leaders were bought off, sometimes as ineffectively 
as happened in Bamako, Mali’s capital, with prominent Ifogha leader Iyad Ag Ghaly. 
Ag Ghaly was a key Tuareg rebel leader in the 199s. When his prominence among 
mainstream Tuareg rebels collapsed due to his collaboration with Bamako in the late 
2000s, he reinvented himself  as a religious warrior. 
Beginning in the aftermath of  9/11, the War on Terror and its core assumptions 
propelled the militarisation of  American counterterrorism policy in the Western Sahel.16 
As the US sought partners against terror, most states in North Africa offered help 
and requested military assistance. However, their new-found military capacity and 
diplomatic support were directed against old enemies, such as the Sahrawi for Morocco 
and the Tuareg for Mali and Niger.17 We do not need to speculate on Malian intentions, 
for President Touré’s government consistently sought US assistance to achieve military 
control of  the north, while no progress was ever made towards any other solution.18 By 
late , this position had become part of  US policy. Crucially, it carried over exactly 
the same assumptions: control of  all north Malian subjects and spaces that were not 
aligned with the ATT consensus, particularly the Ifoghas. This counterterrorism priority 
14 Whitehouse, Bruce, ‘“A Festival of  Brigands”: In Search of  Democracy and Political Legitimacy in 
Mali’, Strategic Review for Southern Africa; Pretoria , Ȳ  November 1, ² Wing, Susanna D., 
‘Mali: Politics of  a Crisis’, African Affairs 11, Ȳ. 44 1 -uly 1, 4²4.
15 Bøås, Morten and Liv Elin Torheim, ‘The Trouble in Mali—Corruption, Collusion, Resistance’, Third 
World Quarterly 4, Ȳ  1 August 1, 19²19.
16 Zoubir, ‘The United States and Maghreb–Sahel Security’, 987; ‘The Sahara-Sahel Quagmire: Regional 
and International 5amifications’, Mediterranean Politics 1, Ȳ  November 1, 1, 4²4 McFate, 
Sean, ‘U.S. AFRICA COMMAND: A New Strategic Paradigm?’, Military Review; Fort Leavenworth , Ȳ 1 
(February 2008), 10–21; Cline, ‘Counterterrorism Strategy in the Sahel’.
17 Solomon, Hussein, ‘The African State and the Failure of  US Counter-Terrorism Initiatives in Africa: 
The Cases of  Nigeria and Mali’, South African Journal of  International Affairs , Ȳ  1 December 1, 
427–445.
18 See also Bøås and Torheim, ‘The Trouble in Mali—Corruption, Collusion, Resistance’; Solomon, ‘The 
African State and the Failure of  US Counter-Terrorism Initiatives in Africa’; Sandor,Adam, ‘Assemblages 
of  Intervention Politics, Security, and Drug Trafficking in West Africa’, Thesis, Universitp d’Ottawa
University of  Ottawa, 2016), http://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/handle/10393/34259.
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trumped long-term humanitarian, social, and economic, as well as consensual military, 
development. The apparent transposition onto US policy of  the Malian representation 
of  the conflict suggests that this shift was informed by a shared understanding of  the 
significance of  uncontrolled nomads to the US-led War on Terror. Specifically, we are 
looking at how ‘a very complex environment could be incorrectly completely subsumed 
into a counterterrorism framework’.19 In other words, this specific representation was 
persuasive, not in reinventing these subjects as new terrorists, but rather absorbing them 
into the existing powerful categories of  terror-enablers or potential terrorists. We might 
be observing an example of  the dictum on the back of  this journal, that ‘perception 
becomes reality’. This paper enquires into how this was possible.
This incredible diplomatic event was achieved through a tendentious representation 
of  the political identity of  nomadic subjects. While diplomacy does not, of  course, 
comprise the totality of  a state’s capacity to see the world, it plays a key role in 
‘recognising’ other actors. Furthermore, diplomacy is of  great interest  for scholarly, 
policy, and strategic research because it reflects and often includes the output of  non-
diplomatic practices, such as espionage, that also inform policy. This paper analyses 
this extraordinary act of  persuasion and its unfolding in diplomacy, and in so doing 
makes contributions to understanding strategic communications. It proposes a method 
to determine how diplomatic communications constitute representations of  identity 
and how these representations develop, and identifies when specific representations 
cross from the diplomacy of  one actor to that of  another and are repeated natively, 
that is, repeated, embraced, and written as their own, demonstrating persuasion. These 
two vital questions are explored through the case of  US-Malian diplomacy during 
2006–2010 to allow for the conceptually-driven methods developed by the author to be 
demonstrated against empirical evidence of  diplomatic communication. 
This paper takes five steps to address these vital questions of  representation and 
persuasion in diplomatic communication. It first introduces the relevance and potential 
contribution to strategic communications of  post-structuralist discourse analysis, 
textuality, and conceptualisations of  identity. Second, it introduces the reader to the 
theory-powered diplomatic communication analysis method developed by the author—
who should at this point confess to being an International Relations (IR) theorist 
and diplomatic analyst—and has been demonstrated in a number of  historical and 
contemporary case studies.20 Third, by applying this method, the paper shows how the 
representation of  conflict in the Sahel and of  Mali’s nomadic subjects was constituted 
19 Cline, Lawrence E.  ‘Nomads, Islamists, and Soldiers: The Struggles for Northern Mali’, Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism , Ȳ  1 August 1, 1.
20 As well as the aforementioned research on US-Malian and US-Moroccan diplomacy, see also de Orel-
lana The Diplomatic Road to Vietnam, (London: IB Tauris, forthcoming late 2017). 
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in the diplomatic communication that was so successful in 2008. Fourth, the analysis 
follows these representations across years of  communications, hundreds of  diplomatic 
cables, memoranda, and other documents, to identify and examine the instances when 
the representations promoted by Malian diplomacy came to be so persuasive to US 
diplomacy and policy-making, such that by 2008 they had come to be absorbed and 
repeated. Finally, the fifth section summarises and synthesises how this study and its 
methodology can bring empirical and analytical contributions to the understanding of  
strategic communications. It is argued that this article and its empirical demonstration 
should encourage placing epistemology, language, and discourse at the centre of  
strategic communications analysis. Crucially, representation of  identity emerges as the 
most powerful aspect of  diplomatic and strategic communications.
Step 1: Diplomats, strategists, admen, and identity
It seems intuitive that name-calling should matter in political practices. Descriptions 
play a key role in international politics—but how? How can their persuasive success 
be determined in empirical analysis? In communication, including diplomacy, the 
difference between a freedom fighter and a terrorist is quite literally one of  subjective 
name-calling. Descriptions constitute the subjectivity that distinguishes terrorists from 
freedom-fighters, which is no less than a normative frame separating good from bad 
violence. They reflect interpretive and subjective political choices that seek to identify 
who an actor is. These choices are the product of  practices such as diplomacy, policy 
analysis, journalism, or strategic communications, that locate actors within existing 
frameworks, thus determining how they should be described. In the categorising frames 
of  the War on Terror, an actor can be described as terrorist, terrorist-enabler, or reliable 
ally. Long-term, stable, descriptive trends—more accurately called ‘representations’—
and the frames that make sense of  them, are involved in producing one’s understanding 
of  international actors.21 
5epresentations of  subjects, conflicts, and the contexts that motivate them are very 
powerful. This is a basic insight that, despite conceptual differences, can be shared by 
strategic communications practitioners and post-structuralist, critical, and interpretive 
IR theorists and analysts. In this shared analytical space provided by the perspective that 
the how of  communication is crucial, this paper examines the interpretive requirements 
of  studying representation in diplomatic communication, while adding methods that 
can unlock their functional dynamics and evaluate their persuasive success. This article 
21 Shapiro, M. J., The Politics of  Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis 
(Madison: University of  Wisconsin Press, 1988), 12, 48.
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addresses practitioner and research interests on what makes communication effective,22 
bringing to bear critical IR theory approaches to the question of  how representations 
of  political identity function,23 post-structuralist concepts and methods for analysing 
text and intertextuality,24 and the growing and conceptually-informed interest in 
international and particularly diplomatic practices.25
This theory-powered, practice-attentive discursive analysis arsenal is used to analyse 
US-Malian diplomatic communication during the period 2006–2010. If  Mali was able 
to shift American policy in the late 2000s, it stands as a vital lesson for the study and 
practice of  strategic communications. The evidence so far is extremely suggestive. 
However, analysis is yet to empirically determine how Malian arguments persuaded US 
policymakers. It is thus vital to examine how Malian diplomacy represented the situation 
in the north of  the country and whether US diplomats and policymakers believed in this 
view of  the situation and in the proposed solutions.  
Diplomacy has long been both a target of  and vehicle for strategic communications. 
Renaissance diplomat-thinkers like Niccolò dei Machiavelli and François de Callières 
were keenly aware that diplomatic communication, particularly how it described 
people and situations, had major consequences of  strategic significance.26 Studying 
diplomatic communication requires acknowledging its vast complexity and multifaceted 
22 Castells, Manuel, Communication Power Oxford Oxford University Press, 1 Miskimmon, Alister, 
Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and International Relations (Univer-
sity of  Michigan Press, 2012); Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order (Routledge, 
2014); Farwell, james P., Persuasion and Power: The Art of  Strategic Communication Washington, DC George-
town University Press, 2012).
 See Goff, Patricia  and Kevin Dunn, Identity and Global Politics: Theoretical and Empirical Elaborations (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Williams, Michael C., ‘Identity and the Politics of  Security’, European 
Journal of  International Relations 4, Ȳ   1 -une 199, 4² William E. Connolly, ‘Identity and Differ-
ence in Global Politics’, in International/Intertextual Relations Lexington, Mass. Lexington Books, 199 
Campbell, David, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of  Identity, 2nd Revised edition 
1998. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Neumann, Iver B., ‘Self  and Other in Interna-
tional Relations’, European Journal of  International Relations 2, no. 2 (1996), 139–174.
24 Derian, J. Der, (ed.), International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of  World Politics Lexington, 
Mass. Lexington Books, 199 Bakhtin, M. M., Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, 
trans. Caryl Emerson Austin University of  Texas Press, 19 Charlotte Epstein, ‘Who Speaks" Dis-
course, the Subject and the Study of  Identity in International Politics’, European Journal of  International 
Relations 17, no. 2 (2011), 327–350.
25 For the Practice Turn, see Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, eds., International Practices (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Vincent Pouliot, International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice 
of  Multilateral Diplomacy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016). For a focus on diplomacy’s 
production of  knowledge, see Neumann, Iver B., At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign 
Ministry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).
26 See for instance Machiavelli’s ‘Notule’ [notes for ambassadors] in Tutte Le Opere Storiche, Politiche e Let-
terarie, ed. A. Capata (Rome: Newton Compton, 2011); and Louis XIV’s ambassador François de Callières, 
De la manière de négocier avec les souverains (Paris: Michel Brunet, 1716).
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potential for subjectivity. At any one point, there are several—at least four—streams of  
communication to study: two-way communication between the diplomat and her bosses, 
and the same again for her interlocutor speaking on behalf  of  another state (In our case: 
US diplomats speaking to Malian officials, US diplomats reporting back home, Malian 
diplomats doing the same). The diplomatic communicator is part of  a vast institution 
of  diplomatic knowledge production.27 Diplomats gather information and report to 
policymakers back home and receive instructions as to what to say to the representatives 
of  other states, who in turn report to and receive instructions from a similarly complex 
diplomatic establishment. In other words, because diplomats and diplomatic institutions 
are both the targets and the messengers of  strategic communications, their reports are 
a locus where depiction, description, and representation are of  paramount importance. 
Commercially, there is a thriving trade in strategic communications focusing on 
‘branding’.28 Communications consultants in Washington, for example, established the 
Moroccan-American Center for Policy (MACP), which successfully rebranded Morocco 
as ‘the kingdom on the move’, an ‘exemplary’ ‘Islamic democracy’ ‘naturally’ disinclined to 
extremism.29 Scholarly literature on this PR approach is primarily concerned with ‘nation 
branding’, and emphasises the fact that wording can achieve policy goals by favourably 
representing states. It rests on the assumption that representation of  international actors 
is flexible and that diplomacy, both formal and public, can misrepresent a state.30 The 
literature raises the question of  how diplomatic communication produces the ‘textual 
image’ of  an international actor, whether through tailored lies, or through disingenuous 
or optimistic writing.
The PR-based literature on ‘nation branding’ thus far appears uninterested in analysing 
how branding is conceptually constituted, and equally uninterested in empirically 
determining whether its promotion has been successful. It is suggestive to consider 
that US policy shifted just as Malian leaders desired, but it does not prove that Malian 
diplomacy achieved this feat. This is because the study of  a brand’s persuasiveness 
27 See especially chapter 4 in Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats.
 The British firm Portland Communications is a good example.
29 This campaign was so successful that its slogans came to be included in American diplomats’ reports 
on Morocco. See http://moroccoonthemove.com and Pablo de Orellana, ‘Struggles over Identity in 
Diplomacy: “Commie Terrorists” Contra “Imperialists” in Western Sahara’, International Relations 9, Ȳ  4 
(1 December 2015), 477–499.
30 Fan, Ying, ‘Branding the Nation: Towards a Better Understanding’, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 
6, no. 2 (May 2010): 97–103; Jian Wang, ‘Managing National Reputation and International Relations in 
the Global Era Public Diplomacy 5evisited’, Public Relations Review , Ȳ   -une  91²9 Szondi, 
Gyorgy, ‘From Image Management to 5elationship Building A Public 5elations Approach to Nation 
Branding’, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy , Ȳ 4 November 1, ²4 Szondi, Gyorgy, Public 
Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of  
International Relations,Clingendael’ 2008).
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is hostage to the logic of  ‘perception’: how somebody sees something. Since social 
science cannot (yet) drill into your head and empirically determine how you perceive 
me, I5 scholars have had to find other avenues. Conversely, -onathan Fisher’s analysis 
of  how Uganda and Kenya managed donor-state perceptions focuses on the ‘images’ 
communicated in routine diplomacy.31 This approach explores what diplomatic 
communication says in terms of  identity. It raises the question of  how ‘images’ are 
constituted in diplomacy and how to empirically determine whether and how they are 
believed enough to be absorbed by another actor’s diplomatic establishment. 
The approaches discussed, even the Renaissance diplomatic literature, concur on the 
importance of  how an international actor is seen in cultural, political, and other contexts 
its identity. Representation of  identity and its links to other representations situate an 
actor in the international context. Policy, strategy, and political decisions are predicated 
on calculations of  how a group of  subjects will behave, which are partly constituted 
through descriptions that make sense of  the subjects, their contexts, past actions, and 
their motives.32 Representations of  political identity, provided by diplomats, analysts, 
and spies, are immensely influential upon policymaking and strategy.33 This is why they 
are the most evident targets of  communications strategies, such as Morocco’s ‘kingdom 
on the move’, and why so much was at stake in persuading American policymakers that 
Mali’s unruly nomads were global enemies. It is within the construction of  representation 
that we find the key to its subjectivity. This epistemological challenge is ideally addressed 
through concepts and methods drawn from a post-structuralist approach to identity, 
and the role of  identity in international relations. 
Step 2: Reading identity in the text of  diplomatic communication
From a post-structuralist perspective, identity is a discourse describing and locating a 
group of  subjects. I say ‘discourse’—a coherent set of  statements based on the same 
subjectivity—because identity is a composite construction constituted of  a variety of  
31 Fisher, Jonathan, ‘Structure, Agency and Africa in the International System: Donor Diplomacy and 
Regional Security Policy in East Africa since the 1990s’, Conflict, Security & Development 1, Ȳ  1 Decem-
ber 2013), 537–567; Fisher, Jonathan ‘ “Some More Reliable than Others”: Image Management, Donor 
Perceptions and the Global War on Terror in East African Diplomacy’, The Journal of  Modern African 
Studies 1, Ȳ  1 1, 1²1 Fisher, -onathan, ‘Managing Donor Perceptions Contextualizing Uganda’s 
2007 Intervention in Somalia’, African Affairs 111, Ȳ  444 -uly 1, 1, 44²4.
32 Ashley, Richard K., ‘Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War’, in International/Intertex-
tual Relations: Postmodern Readings of  World Politics, ed. -ames Der Derian and Michael -. Shapiro Lexington, 
Mass. Lexington Books, 199, 9.
33 Shapiro, The Politics of  Representation, 9²1. A spectacular example is Kissinger’s briefing to Ford on 
Western Sahara in 19, in which the entire conflict was reduced to ‘Algeria wants a port’, which made 
POLISARIO a simple Algerian stooge, in Mundy, Jacob, ‘Neutrality or Complicity? The United States 
and the 1975 Moroccan Takeover of  the Spanish Sahara’, The Journal of  North African Studies 11, Ȳ  
(2006), 275–306.
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contingent referents. Each of  these referents, linguistically constructed linking concepts 
that act as the key building blocks of  identity, links subjects or differentiates them from 
one another. For example, language is a key referent when differentiating between British 
and French identity. These key referents include ‘deep referents’ that are older and 
apparently permanent cultural attributes, such as my very Italian passion for spaghetti.34 
Crucially, representations of  identity include referents that locate subjects in global 
subjective frames—‘Muslim’, for example, is one of  the most powerful referents of  
our time. Linking subjects to referents and categorising them into existing frames takes 
place in communication and among communications.35 This is because the ‘connection 
between what signifies and what is signified’ is constituted by the very language and 
formal structures that represent the link.36 Representation is reliant on language and is 
textual, or as 5oland Barthes would remind us, textualisable, and can thus be analysed 
using the methods of  discursive analysis.37 In this context, therefore, diplomacy is a 
practice that not only deals in texts that explain difference, but which also depends on 
difference to exist.38 
Instances of  linking/differentiation take place in four dimensions: subjects, space, time, 
and norms. While each is vital for the categorisation of  identity, they contribute to 
and draw on one another. Representations of  subjects include race, birth, culture, and 
even physical features, but draw heavily on the other three dimensions, which act as 
explanations of  what these subjects want, and why. For example, American diplomacy 
in the 1940s represented Vietnamese people as ‘indolent’, ‘lazy’, and ‘naturally apolitical’; 
attributes explained by the location of  a backward Asian race in a hot and humid 
tropical climate.39 Locating subjects in the spatial dimension ascribes attributes framed 
by geography. The ‘Global South’ or the ‘Middle East’ are examples where geography 
contributes to how these subjects and their politics are seen.40 Locating identity in a 
temporal dimension frames it within a continuum of  development or civilization, as, 
4 Connolly, ‘Identity and Difference in Global Politics’ Connolly, William E., Identity\Difference: Democrat-
ic Negotiations of  Political Paradox (Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 2002).
35 Constantinou, C. M., O. P. Richmond, and A. Watson, Cultures and Politics of  Global Communication: 
Volume 34, Review of  International Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
36 Foucault, Michel, Archaeology of  Knowledge (Routledge, 2002); Foucault, M., The Order of  Things: An 
Archaeology of  the Human Sciences (London: Routledge, 2002), 74.
37 Barthes, Roland, ‘S/Z’, New York: Hill and Wang (1974); Barthes, R., Leçon Inaugurale de La Chaire de 
Semiologie Litteraire Du College de France (Éditions du Seuil, 1978); Barthes, R., Image Music Text, New Ed 
edition. (London: Fontana Press, 1993).
38 Derian, J. Der , On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of  Western Estrangement Oxford Oxford University Press, 
1987).
39 Bradley, Mark Philip, Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of  Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950 
(Chapel Hill: University of  North Carolina Press, 2000).
40 See ‘On geography’ in M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, ed. C. Gordon New <ork Pantheon Books, 
1980).
Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 3 | Autumn 2017114
for example, the ‘Orientalised Middle East’ is represented as continually backward,41 
and can additionally frame subjects and events within narratives that create causal 
links. Normative frames locate actors within existing ethical discourses, representing 
good and evil by reference to existing normative structures.42 The French Resistance, 
for instance, are not remembered as terrorists (even though their tactics clearly were 
terrorist) because of  their opposition to Nazism. The four frames build politically 
comprehensible identities that can enable a variety of  outcomes, from discourses 
justifying and requiring violence, to alliances against mutual foes. 
This is how text makes identity. Building on this insight, we can move to analyse how 
diplomacy produces representations of  identity, how they change over time, and when 
they persuade. This, in turn, necessitates the methodological advances developed by 
the author in order to research how diplomacy writes, reads, and rewrites identity—
advances that are possible only thanks to the work of  pioneering post-structuralists that 
have conceptualised and examined diplomacy and identity as text and as practice.43 This 
method, the diplomatic text, is an analytical engine that brings together a rationale for data 
selection and three textual analysis methods. 
Primary data selection focuses on practices of  diplomatic knowledge production. This is 
not limited to the work of  professional diplomats, as other agents occasionally carry out 
diplomatic duties. The standard for selecting evidence is determined as the textual trail of  
what Constantinou calls ‘embassy of  theory’, the diplomatic process constituted by the 
delegation of  the presence of  the state.44 Consequently, data selection includes classical 
diplomatic documents such as cables and memoranda, and also speeches, memos, and 
reports authored by non-diplomats, such as leaders or parliamentarians, but only those 
that are produced when representing the state.45 That is, while US diplomatic cables to 
41 Said, Edward W., Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003).
42 Connolly, Identity, Difference, 206.
43 Particularly Der Derian, On Diplomacy; Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell, 1992); and Neumann, ‘Self  and Other in International Relations’; Russia and the Idea of  Europe: 
A Study in Identity and International Relations, vol.  Hove, East Sussex, UK Psychology Press, 199 
Uses of  the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1999 ‘The English School on Diplomacy Scholarly Promise Unfulfilled’, International Relations 1, Ȳ 
3 (1 September 2003): 341–369; ‘Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of  Diplomacy’, 
Millenium: Journal of  International Studies 1, Ȳ  ,  At Home with the Diplomats; Diplomatic Sites: A 
Critical Enquiry, 2013; Williams, Michael C. and Iver B. Neumann, ‘From Alliance to Security Community: 
NATO, Russia, and the Power of  Identity’, Millennium – Journal of  International Studies 9, Ȳ  1 -une 
2000), 357–387.
44 Constantinou, C. M.,  On the Way to Diplomacy (Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 1996).
45 This accounts for concern on instances of  practice—which I address from the perspective of  their 
investment in text, such as the negotiations studied in 5ebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, ‘Power 
in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya’, European Journal of  International Relations 
, Ȳ 4 1 December 14, 9²911.
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and from Mali total nearly one thousand documents, many are procedural or irrelevant 
because documents such as invoices do not engage in representation of  the state, nor do 
they describe the actors and agents diplomats are dealing with. Documents analysed for 
this paper include US diplomatic communication between the US embassies in Bamako 
and the State Department during 2006–2010, and documents of  diplomatic relevance, 
as per the above selection rationale. We are specifically looking for contextualised 
descriptions of  oneself  and others by US and Malian officials, by representatives from 
Tuareg groups, especially the Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC), and by other 
individuals claiming to represent Tuareg grievances. This rationale additionally entails 
the inclusion of  some documents from the US diplomatic mission in Niamey, Niger, 
reporting on Tuareg issues affecting both Niger and Mali. In US missions, cables are 
drafted by embassy staff, particularly the Political Officer, the Military Attachp, or the 
Deputy Head of  Mission, or sometimes dictated by the Ambassador. The common 
reoccurrence of  signatures (almost always bearing the Ambassador’s name or that of  the 
Political Officer is misleading, for this denotes signing off  rather than drafting, much 
as most cables from the State Department are signed with the name of  the Secretary. 
Cables from missions reveal what American diplomats were reporting back to their 
superiors in Washington. However, it is also necessary to consider communications 
from the State Department back to Bamako and Niamey, as well as communications 
to the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) and other missions interested in 
Sahelian issues, for these documents bear feedback on reporting, assessments, priorities, 
and instructions, and reveal what Washington officials prioritised, which items from 
the missions’ reporting they absorbed, and which they did not. In other words, policy 
developments are clearly reflected in cables from the State Department, which often 
come replete with citations of  work by policy-making bodies such as the National 
Security Council’s Principals’ Committee. To complete the policy side of  the cascade 
of  reporting from the ground up to policymakers, it is necessary to draw also on non-
diplomatic documents that are included by the data selection rationale, including public 
appearances, speeches, and statements by key policymakers in the Senate, the State 
Department, the Department of  Defence, and the White House. The vast majority 
of  the documents are available only due to the leak in 2010 of  hundreds of  thousands 
of  diplomatic cables by Wikileaks, which has allowed analysis to take place before 
declassification and release, but also imposes limitations including being restricted to the 
timeframe of  leaked documents. Because the method depends on wide documentary 
availability, it is ideally executed on historical cases, cases with vast leaks such as this 
one, or from within a diplomatic institution. The documents selected for this analysis 
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The first analytical step determines how a description constitutes and situates an 
actor. It draws on Foucauldian archaeology which, beyond linguistic analysis of  how 
words suggest meaning, ‘retrieves’ or identifies and examines the modes, rules, and 
references that make the expression of  identity discursively meaningful and subjectively 
operational. As will be demonstrated in the next section, this step reveals how identity 
works in specific texts, and additionally retrieves textual markers, called topoi, that 
signpost the presence of  the specific aspects and architectures of  representation. These 
markers allow the next analytical step—to follow exact representations of  political 
identity across time and countless texts. 
The second analytical step maps the chronological evolution of  representations across 
hundreds of  texts. This analysis is based on Foucaldian and Nietzschean genealogy, a 
method used to trace the history of  an idea.47 Following the textual markers identified 
in the previous step, it maps which representations thrive, disappear, or change within 
each diplomatic establishment. This evolution is charted chronologically and across the 
institution, from the reports of  diplomats on the ground to the memoranda handed 
to policymakers. We are dealing with a number of  locutors and authors producing 
the ‘picture’ that contributed to shaping decisions, including Malian government 
representatives, US diplomats reporting, Tuareg representatives from various factions 
or none, Malian Civil society representatives, and policymakers prioritising and deciding 
and then writing back to the missions abroad. It is across these documents, their 
categorisation and prioritisation driven by dominant policy concerns, that the American 
‘picture’ of  events in Mali is forged. That is, it is not only what Malian officials said that 
matters, but especially how this information was treated on its way back to policymakers’ 
desks. This will be demonstrated in the fourth section.
The genealogy and the archival research are carried out backwards. They begin with 
texts denoting that a policy shift had indeed occurred, and travel backwards through 
the history of  those policy-determinant representations to establish their development 
and provenance. Having mapped the story of  specific representations within each 
country’s diplomatic knowledge production, the third step identifies representations 
that cross over into the diplomatic knowledge production of  another state with 
which it is in contact. When a representation (e.g. you readers, interested in strategic 
46 All Wikileaks documents can be searched by reference number: https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/
(accessed 25 October 2017).
4 Foucault, Michel, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in Nietzsche, ed. John Richardson and Brian Leiter 
Oxford OUP, 1, 19²14 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, ‘Genealogy of  Morals’, in Basic Writings of  
Nietzsche (New York: Modern Library, 2000).
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communications analysis methods) crosses over, is repeated up that country’s chain 
of  diplomatic reporting, and becomes common within it, still carrying the exact same 
architecture (readers+interest: StratComms+analysis+methods), it is fair to conclude 
that it was believed and absorbed. This is particularly evident when it begins to shape 
policy assumptions. 
The consequences of  identity-making cannot be underestimated. The method used here 
can uncover and explain the vital identity-making precursors to specific international 
phenomena, such as securitisation and stigmatisation,48 alliances,49 and even diplomatic 
sponsorship affording protection from the international community, which is particularly 
important for states in dubious normative terrain, such as those occupying or annexing 
territory, for example, Israel or Morocco. 
Step 3: Representations of  nomads, terrorism, and crime in US-Malian diplomacy
The first analytical move analyses how US and Malian diplomatic communications 
represented the conflict, its subjects, contexts, and solutions. The four texts analysed 
below were selected to represent the most important portrayals in US-Malian diplomatic 
relations of  this period. Crucially, they are texts that illustrate how representations 
crossed over from one country’s diplomacy to the other’s. This substantiates the above-
discussed crossover into US diplomacy of  Malian representations of  the conflict, and 
demonstrates how these representations worked and how they are constructed.
The first key text is the report of  a meeting on  February  between Malian 
President Touré, the Malian Military Chief  of  Staff  Saydou Traoré, US Ambassador 
Terence McCulley, and AF5ICOM commander General William Ward.50 Drafted by 
Political Officer Aaron Sampson, it is an example of  the occasional diplomatic functions 
of  non-diplomats, such as military and government leaders. The ‘continued instability 
in northern Mali’ is represented as determined by space, military weakness, and Tuareg 
criminality. Lack of  military control of  the ‘650,000 sq. km. of  terrain in northern Mali’ 
was due to ‘porous borders’ and especially ‘traffickers looking to turn quick profits by 
whatever means available’, including collaborating with and enabling al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb [AQIM]. This representation of  northern Mali conjures Wild West-like 
chaos in ‘vast’ empty spaces inhabited by lawless Tuareg subjects dedicated to ‘banditry’ 
and ‘trafficking’. In their intrinsic criminality, these subjects constitute the lawless space 
of  northern Mali, and are in turn constituted by that spatial context. In addition, they 
48 Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, ‘Stigma Management in International Relations: Transgressive Identities, 
Norms, and Order in International Society’, International Organization , Ȳ 1 -anuary 14, 14²1.
49 Williams and Neumann, ‘From Alliance to Security Community’.
 , BAMAKO1. To accompany this analysis, the full text is available at https://search.
wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAMAKO217_a.html (accessed 15 June 2017).
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are solidly set in a temporal frame that represents them as backwards in development 
and governance.51 Lawlessness could not be contained due to ‘the Malian military’s lack 
of  resources’, whence the President’s request for American military trucks, arms, and 
combat helicopters. This was not only a question of  materiél, but also of  necessary 
conditions before Mali is able to fulfil its commitments to the US and TSCTP, it ‘must 
cut off  the routes used by drugs, arms, and human trafficking’. 
This aspect of  the representation of  the security challenge in Mali is vital. Without 
total and exclusive Malian military control, new hardware, as well as expanded and 
new garrisons, this situation will continue to enable terrorism. Achieving military 
control is represented as a necessary condition to any other Malian action in the north, 
including fighting A4IM and the long-awaited economic development promised in 
the Algiers Accords. Tourp explained that ‘Mali wants to help the US counter Islamic 
extremism but that Mali must deal with its security issues on its own’. Mali’s future 
counterterrorism efforts were thus predicated on first finding a military—not social 
or economic—solution to Tuareg issues. Malian diplomacy consistently represented 
itself  as supportive of  the War on Terror, and throughout diplomatic contact with 
the US repeatedly ‘pledged Mali’s continued strong support for the US in the fight 
against global terrorism’. At the close of  a meeting with Deputy Secretary of  State 
John Negroponte, American diplomats noted: ‘ “You can”, said the President, “count 
on us”.’52 Malian diplomacy was keen to convey that Mali was most willing to help with 
counterterrorism, but that it needed first to control the Tuareg by military means with 
US assistance. 
This representation of  the conflict in the north, its context, dynamics, and solutions, 
appears in a US embassy report a year later.53 The cable to the State Department 
discusses whether the defeat of  veteran Tuareg rebel Ibrahim ag Bahanga might finally 
‘enable northern units commanded by Bamako to turn their sights on other pressing 
northern security matters including AQIM’. The importance of  this cable cannot be 
overstated. It contains the same articulation of  the Malian security challenge discussed 
above: military control of  the Tuareg to be followed by the implementation of  the 
Algiers Accords and counterterrorism operations. Remarkably, it is posited as a policy 
assumption, demonstrating that the military-first approach desired by Bamako had 
been absorbed into US policy together with the representation of  the Tuareg problem. 
51 For the an analysis of  this Orientalist representation of  this space and subjects, see Vatin, Jean-Claude, 
‘Désert Construit et Inventé, Sahara Perdu Ou Retrouvé: Le Jeu Des Imaginaires’, Revue de l’Occident 
Musulman et de La Méditerranée , Ȳ 1 194, 1²11. For a contemporary American popular culture 
expression of  this lawless desert imaginary, see the TV show ‘American Odyssey’, 1.
52 28/11/2007, 07BAMAKO1361. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BAMAKO1361_a.html 
(accessed 15 June 2017).
53 12/2/2009, 09BAMAKO85.
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This document furthermore denotes absorption of  the nomads of  northern Mali into 
existing War on Terror categories of  facilitators and occasional participants in terrorism, 
i.e. AQIM. This is a vital insight because it suggests that there was no precise policy 
decision that Malian nomads facilitated or participated in terrorism. Rather, we are 
observing a far smaller step the inclusion of  these subjects into the existing category 
of  North African terrorists. 
The military-first solution relied heavily on representing Tuareg subjects not only 
as occasional smugglers and petty criminals, but as inherently lawless professional 
felons. This representation focused on rebel leader Ibrahim ag Bahanga, who in 2007 
refused to disarm and held out with a small force in Tin Zaouatine, on the Algerian 
border. Until he was defeated in 2009, Malian diplomacy consistently described him 
as a bandit interested only in trafficking. A cable detailing a meeting between Malian 
Foreign Minister Moctar Ouane and Deputy Assistant Secretary of  State Todd Moss 
reports that Ouane described Bahanga’s rebels as ‘a small number of  Tuareg bandits’.54 
‘>B@andits like Ibrahim Bahanga’, Ouane explained, ‘had no political motivations, had 
formulated no political demands, and were solely interested in securing a portion of  
Malian territory for illicit trafficking’. 
Malian diplomacy consistently represented the Tuareg way of  life as based on 
smuggling,55 crime, and conflict motivated by greed.56 This is a powerful normative 
frame that depoliticises Tuareg rebellion, pulling these subjects and their war out of  the 
possibility of  ethical conflict. Another consequence is that engagement in negotiations 
or obtaining help against AQIM appears unthinkable. This is, of  course, untrue. Many 
Tuareg call themselves ‘businessmen’ with better reason than any, having traded and 
controlled Saharan routes for over a millennium.57 This representation reinforces 
Malian arguments that their very presence, if  unsupervised, enables terrorism because 
they would have no qualms about supporting A4IM for profit.
This representation was fully and unproblematically absorbed into US diplomatic 
reporting. In a response from October 2008 to a State Department enquiry on why 
‘president Toure appears reluctant to enter into negotiations with Bahanga’, the US 
Embassy explains that ‘Bahanga’s overriding interest appears to be carving out 
Tinzawaten >sic@ as a personal fiefdom to secure revenues from drugs, arms and 
54 13/6/2008, 08BAMAKO558. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAMAKO558_a.html 
(accessed 15 June 2017).
55 08/07/2008, 08BAMAKO639.
 See for example 919, 9BAMAKO1 and 111, BAMAKO9.
57 Bøås and Torheim, ‘The Trouble in Mali—corruption, Collusion, Resistance’, 1281. Considering their 
military successes as well as those of  POLISARIO 1975–87, it should be conceivable, as they have them-
selves often suggested, to draw on their expertise in desert warfare.
Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 3 | Autumn 2017120
cigarette trafficking’.58 This is the same description delivered by Foreign Minister Ouane 
in the above-analysed meeting, expounded in exactly the same articulation and similar 
wording—though using the more medieval-sounding term ‘fiefdom’. This does not 
have to be seen as a manipulative lie; it was common opinion in Bamako at the time, 
and thus this act of  persuasion may not have been instrumental. Crucially, its relevance 
for this analysis is that its core conceptualisation and depiction was carried over to US 
reporting on the issue. Believing this representation of  the Tuareg and their criminality—
driven by the depoliticisation of  Bahanga and his cause—was a catastrophic mistake 
for US diplomats and policymakers. After the fall of  Gaddafi in 11, Bahanga rallied 
armed Tuaregs in Libya to the banner of  the National Movement for the Liberation 
of  Azawad (MNLA), which in 2012 launched the biggest Tuareg uprising since Malian 
independence. 
These representations and their constituent discursive elements were effective, and 
were soon absorbed into US thinking on the issue as reflected in the diplomatic 
correspondence. In this picture, lawless and vast ungoverned spaces inhabited by 
opportunistic and determined criminals like Bahanga cohered with the need for military 
control. Malian military weakness, the War on Terror, and the presence of  AQIM in 
the Malian-Algerian borderlands provided the urgency for the gradual shift away from 
the previous development-based approach. The (mis)perception of  Tuareg criminality 
sabotaged the ethics of  preventing extremism through development, sustaining the 
notion that unpoliced Tuaregs enabled A4IM. This representation of  the conflict, and 
its context and subjects, provided the tenets for a policy shift that made sense in the 
context of  the War on Terror. Understanding the construction of  this representation 
of  the conflict, however, raises the question of  how it found its way into American 
diplomacy. 
Step 4: The evolution of  textual representations of  identity 2006–2010
The previous section analysed the inner workings of  the representation of  the conflict 
as absorbed by US diplomacy and policy. We now move to determine the history of  this 
event by tracing the origins and conditions of  the representation. This involves taking 
an intertextual and trans-institutional perspective, establishing how representations 
crossed between diplomatic institutions and the conditions that made this possible. 
This takes the analysis back in time from the texts analysed in the previous section, and 
back and forth between the Malian and American diplomatic institutions concerned.
58 3/10/2008, 08BAMAKO824. https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAMAKO824_a.html 
(accessed 15 June 2017).
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Mapping the development of  representations during 2006–2010 reveals several 
shifts. Malian diplomacy depicted a conflict driven by greed, rather than by political 
grievances. This became particularly persistent after the ADC signed the Algiers 
Accords with Mali in -uly , leaving only Bahanga’s Tuareg faction still fighting. 
Between 2006 and Bahanga’s death in 2011, he and all Tuareg in arms were described as 
criminals, feeding the need for military control before implementing the Algiers Accords. 
These representations were absorbed into US diplomacy in mid-2008 and late 2008 
respectively. Tuareg descriptions of  the conflict during ²1 consistently focused 
on Malian unwillingness to implement the Algiers Accords, the need for development, 
the need to end abuses by Malian troops and militias, and the formation of  mixed 
Malian-Tuareg military units. Furthermore, they repeatedly requested to collaborate in 
anti-AQIM efforts. The only Tuareg complaint that had an impact, in early 2009, was 
their representation of  Malian human rights abuses. 
While US diplomacy initially regarded development and cooperative security 
arrangements as vital to counter-extremism security, from late  these concerns took 
a lesser role as focus shifted to Tuareg criminality and the need for military control. This 
policy shift, it is found, was not the result of  a specific and explicit decision about Mali. 
No evidence was found of  an NSC [National Security Council], DoD, or State decision 
to move US policy toward Mali from a development to a counterterrorism approach 
based on control of  subjects and space. While such a decision might yet emerge upon 
declassification, the diplomatic data available does not reference or seem to defer to 
a new policy decision about Mali. 5ather, by October 9 we find that in terms of  
diplomatic reporting, interagency operations, military policy, and even espionage, Mali 
has been fully absorbed into the broader sweep of  the assumptions and methods of  the 
War on Terror in the Sahel.
These events raise questions as to the conditions that enabled them. First, why didn’t 
representations of  nomadic criminality cross over to US diplomacy before early 2008, 
and why didn’t the military-first approach make the crossover until late , despite 
Malian constancy during 2006–2008? Second, why were Tuareg allegations of  major 
human rights abuses believable in 2009 and not before?
Mali relentlessly restated its commitment to counterterrorism and the need for a 
Tuareg-first military approach. Before the exchange with General Ward analysed above, 
President Touré met President Bush and declared that Mali adhered to ‘all different 
initiatives on the fight against terrorism’.59 This conversation, however, did not include a 
full articulation of  the representation of  the conflict, and did not yield significant policy 
results. In a far more influential precursor, a conference in -anuary  on TSCTP, 
9 1, Office of  the Press Secretary, White House.
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French officials linked ungoverned space, trafficking, insurgency, and A4IM. Widely 
disseminated among the American diplomatic and security community, it likely added 
credence to Malian claims and prepared the ground for their later admissibility.60
Previous attempts to persuade US diplomats and policymakers were not effective. An 
excellent example is an exchange between Tourp and Deputy Secretary Negroponte, 
which featured the same representation of  the conflict including ‘bandits’, ‘more than 
7,000 km’ of  borders, and the need to control the north before counterterrorism efforts 
were possible.61 American diplomats and policymakers did, however, consider Mali 
an important ally in the global war on terrorism and a key member of  [TSCTP]’.62 
Touré’s own regional counterterrorism initiative, a counterterrorism law, requests from 
Foreign Minister Ouane for State Department meetings in 2007, and even an offer to 
host the AFRICOM headquarters in Bamako, garnered sympathy but no change in the 
development-first policy.63 
In the early 2000s the Bush administration was enthusiastic about Malian democracy. In 
this context, ATT and his consensus approach were regarded, particularly by Secretary 
Rice, as having succeeded in nurturing and furthering democracy in Mali and bringing 
the country closer to Western economic development.64 Former Ambassador to Mali 
Robert Pringle called Malian democracy ‘a transformation that seems nothing short 
of  amazing’.65 Rapprochement was therefore facilitated by seeing Mali as a successful 
democracy, a representation that Malian diplomats assiduously reiterated and highlighted 
with comparison to Niger’s brutal repression of  a 2007 Tuareg revolt.66 Backtracking to 
early 2007, US diplomacy still saw development as key to ensuring peace and countering 
extremism. Diplomats were keenly aware that ‘should development efforts lag, violent 
outbreaks may reoccur’, and that US influence should be used to encourage peaceful 
resolution and development.67 Earlier, in 2006, US diplomats did not even believe in 
Mali’s counterterrorist commitment, writing puzzled and politely frustrated reports that 
even rebel Tuareg ADC forces were fighting A4IM, while Mali had never tried.68
60 18/3/2008, 08STATE28385.
61 28/11/2007, 07BAMAKO1361.
62 2/6/2008, 08BAMAKO491; 12/12/2008, 08BAMAKO937.
63 18/9/2007, 07BAMAKO1028; 14/2/2007, 07BAMAKO166; 16/7/2008, 08BAMAKO660; 
22/7/2008, 08BAMAKO676; 1/10/2008, 08BAMAKO821; 29/9/2008, 08BAMAKO817; 11/4/2008, 
08BAMAKO357.
4 See for instance Department Of  State. The Office of  Electronic Information, ‘5emarks at the Com-
munity of  Democracies UNGA Event ² Secretary Condoleezza 5ice’.
65 Pringle, Robert, ‘Mali’s Unlikely Democracy’, The Wilson Quarterly (1976-) , Ȳ  , 1.
66 19/6/2008, 08BAMAKO574; 22/12/2008, 08BAMAKO956; 13/6/2008, 08BAMAKO558.
67 3/4/2007, 07BAMAKO374.
68 31/10/2006, 06BAMAKO1244.
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Malian depictions of  the conflict depended on ‘Tuareg criminality’—a key enabler of  
the Tuareg-first military approach. This representation was energetically promoted by 
Malian diplomats and officials in almost every communication studied. Even peaceful 
Tuareg protests were turned into ‘ransacking’, forcing Malian troops to ‘fire in self-
defence’.69 On the day of  his inauguration in -une , for example, President Tourp 
explained that some Tuaregs ‘provide logistical support to A4IM’ for profit, positing a 
vision of  self-serving violent crime.70 A cable from late 2008 titled ‘Bahanga runs amok’, 
suggests that US understanding of  the conflict was deeply affected by the representation 
of  Tuareg criminality as a way of  life, stating that ‘harassing the Malian military is a part-
time diversion from their full-time job trafficking drugs, guns and contraband’ and that 
Tuaregs were themselves in constant internecine conflict.71 Backtracking to late 2007, 
however, it can be seen that US diplomats and policy did not hold such assumptions and 
still regarded justice, peace, and development initiatives as key. A May 2007 report, for 
example, carries a nuanced description of  Bahanga’s rebellion and its cause, and, while 
it is stated that he had trafficking experience, he is described as a veteran of  the 199 
rebellion, frustrated by the failure to implement the Algiers Accords.72 Likewise, the 
reinsertion and reconciliation of  Tuareg rebels in neighbouring Niger was commended 
as an effective measure of  great counterterrorism value; a stark contrast with the shift 
in late 2008.73
Tuareg leaders and mediators were keen to remonstrate their grievances to US 
diplomats. When questioned on the murder of  Tuaregs by Malian troops in 2008, 
‘top rebel’ Ag Bibi mused that there was ‘no chance Mali would ever investigate the 
murders’.74 National Assembly member Ibrahim Mohamed Asselah told embassy 
officials that they needed ‘infrastructure’ and ‘wells for their communities and animals’, 
but that ‘he was sure the nomadic groups would never receive these wells’.75 Tuareg 
demands were constant:  reduction of  the Malian military presence in northern towns, 
the ‘creation of  mixed military units’ for security, and the investigation of  ‘summary 
executions’.76 Discussing terrorism, ADC leader Deity ag Simadou ‘complained about 
alleged GOM >Government of  Mali@ diversion of  counterterrorism funds to combat 
Tuareg rebels’ and ‘charged that several Malian officials were working with A4IM to 
secure a percentage of  any eventual ransom’.77 Tuareg leaders frequently suggested that 
69 19/11/2008, 08BAMAKO898.
70 19/6/2007, 07BAMAKO676.
71 29/12/2008, 08BAMAKO968; 8/7/2008, 08BAMAKO639.
72 10/5/2007, 07BAMAKO505.
73 10/10/2006, 06NIAMEY113, see also 31/10/2007, 07STATE151024
74 11/12/2008, 08BAMAKO932.
75 14/11/2008, 08BAMAKO888.
76 6/5/2008, 08BAMAKO419.
77 21/5/2008, 08BAMAKO462.
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they could help fight terrorism, recounting with pride two battles in , when the 
ADC alone had taken the fight to A4IM—significantly, this was the unit commanded 
by Mokhtar Belmokhtar.78 
Tuareg claims did not make a significant impact on the US understanding of  the conflict. 
While the need for economic and cooperative security development was well appreciated, 
few Tuareg grievances were ever reported as reliable by US diplomats. This is curious 
considering that allegations featured events as horrific as Malian-sponsored militias led 
by Colonel Meydou executing Tuaregs by crushing their skulls with military vehicles,79 
though in sum it is fair to conclude that by the mid-2000s, diplomatic portrayals of  the 
Tuareg as victims were very ineffective.80 Allegations were taken seriously only in 2009, 
when the Malian military denied the International Committee of  the Red Cross access 
to prisoners feared tortured or executed, revealing attitudes of  perceived unreliability to 
Tuareg communications.81
During this period, the US embassy in Bamako developed considerable expertise 
and strove to provide an advanced understanding of  Malian issues. They employed 
a Tuareg assistant, maintained contact with most major Tuareg factions and leaders, 
reported on the finer details of  the ethnic, clan, and tribal structures of  the Tuareg 
and of  the Hassaniya Arabs of  the north, and even canvassed voters before elections.82 
Far more sanguine about the ‘need for forward movement on the Algiers Accords’ 
than most policymakers in DC,83 the embassy in Bamako warned that unaddressed 
grievances would fuel an uprising and frequently advised that the US pressure Mali to 
implement the Accords.84 It is found that, when they denied that ‘Tuareg smugglers 
or bandits have any religious or ideological links with AQIM’, or remarked that the 
ADC had attacked AQIM twice in 2006, this was not reported further up the chain 
for analysis in Washington.85 In sum, reports from diplomats during 2008–2010 that 
were primarily concerned with justice and development as a solution had little influence 
78 21/5/2008, 08BAMAKO462; 13/9/2007, 07BAMAKO1006; 31/5/2007, 07BAMAKO587.
79 See 27/4/2009, 09BAMAKO257; 21/4/2008, 08BAMAKO375 and earlier.
 See for example =ounmenou, David, ‘5ethinking the Tuareg Factor in the Mali Crisis’, Conflict Trends 
1, Ȳ  1 -anuary 1 1².
81 6/3/2009, 09BAMAKO141.
82 17/4/2008, 08BAMAKO371; 15/12/2006, 06BAMAKO1415.
83 Senator Chris Coons, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, is an im-
portant exception. 
84 2/6/2008, 08BAMAKO491; 6/3/2008, 08BAMAKO239; 3/10/2008, 08BAMAKO824; 21/4/2008, 
08BAMAKO375; 7/4/2008, 08BAMAKO339.
85 17/4/2008, 08BAMAKO371; 6/3/2008, 08BAMAKO239.
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on how officials in Washington saw the situation.86 Reports on security concerns and 
individuals, however, received far greater attention. 
Malian representations of  the conflict were, conversely, very effective in engaging 
dominant US policy concerns. This does not, however, explain why they were effective 
in late 2008 and not before. There was another powerful factor at work: instructions 
from policymakers at the level of  the State Department and above. The history of  
the two key representations, and the fate of  nuanced and detailed reporting from the 
Bamako mission, point to practices of  prioritisation governing the salience of  particular 
perspectives and items of  information. A cable from March 2003 mentions that Mali 
‘is now a EUCOMAF5ICOM high priority country within the context of  >TSCTP@’, a 
shift in practice described as in-progress.87 This suggests that there was a militarisation 
of  reporting and a move to allow AFRICOM to lead initiatives hitherto led by the 
State Department. These practices determined what dominant policy concerns looked 
like, which is why the same Malian representation of  the conflict failed to persuade 
in late , but succeeded in late . This is why the lack of  a specific strategic 
decision concerning Mali makes sense: an increased prioritisation of  security concerns 
subsumed Mali into the existing categories, knowledge, and methods of  the global War 
on Terror. The devil lies, therefore, in the finer bureaucratic details—all the categories 
into which northern Malian nomads were subsumed already existed, which is probably 
why a specific policy decision appears absent and we see a procedural, rather automatic, 
shift to include Mali into global counterterrorism approaches. 
The self-disciplining of  diplomatic knowledge production can be traced in 
communications from the State Department. A cable congratulating the Bamako 
mission on its reporting reveals which information the Department was interested in, 
implying that it was read entirely through a security lens, and analysed by individuals 
and institutions such as the NSC’s Senior Director for Counterterrorism and ‘senior 
policymakers from the Department of  Homeland Security, FBI, and the Department 
of  Defense’.88 The commended cables concerned primarily biographic lists, links to 
trans-Saharan crime, and Mali’s only strike ever against AQIM in 2009.89 Writing was 
heavily conditioned by a set of  instructions on ‘reporting and collection needs: West 
Africa’. An update of  the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) of  24 
February 2003, the instructions subsumed State Department reporting into intelligence 
 An excellent example is cable BAMAKO4, which is never referenced again. For a detailed discus-
sion on this problem, see Pablo de Orellana, ‘When Diplomacy Identifies Terrorists Subjects, Identity 
and Agency in the War On Terror in Mali’, in The Palgrave Handbook of  Global Counterterrorism Policy, (Lon-
don: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
87 3/3/2008, 08BAMAKO219.
88 24/9/2009, 09STATE99793.
89 See for instance 31/7/2008, 08BAMAKO695
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needs. This was not problematic per se, except that it framed and directed diplomatic 
knowledge production around military and intelligence needs, inheriting assumptions 
from these fields of  practice. For instance, reports on ‘insurgents’ and ‘separatists’ were 
filed into the same reporting category. The new instructions did not request reporting 
on the goals of  such groups, but focused instead on their capability to ‘destabilize host 
country government’, ‘links to international terrorist groups’, and ‘criminal activity’, 
stripping the context from these reports and placing all ‘criminal activity’ in the context 
of  terrorism. This is a self-sabotaging lack of  nuance that, in our case, strips the politics 
out of  Tuareg activity due to centrally mandated lack of  context.90
Another interesting revelation that emerges from this analysis concerns policy 
differences between the Bush and Obama governments. While a sharp break in 
policy and its underlying assumptions might be expected, this was not observed in 
US diplomacy and its resulting policy concerning Mali and the Western Sahel. Despite 
her earlier expertise, Condoleezza 5ice had little interest in Africa after the Cold War, 
and during her tenure as National Security Advisor, and later as Secretary of  State, 
her work on Africa concentrated on economic liberalisation, particularly privatisation 
and the Millennium Development Compact.91 Her successor Hillary Clinton did not 
drive any major development in North African policy until the Libyan crisis erupted 
in 11. At the Department of  Defense, 5obert Gates provided continuity in Mali 
and Sahel policy, particularly with his establishment of  AFRICOM in late 2007 and 
its key security initiatives in 2009, bridging the Bush-Obama transition.92 The analysis 
here suggests that neither administration dedicated much policy effort to Mali until 
1. An exception was the effort Secretary 5ice invested in the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation,93 which sought to promote democratic prosperity through development 
aid and a privatisation drive.94 Despite the transition to the Obama administration, the 
AFRICOM-led interagency approach to counter-terrorism in the Sahel remained focused 
on unchanged ‘country-specific requirements and strategies’.95 One notable exception 
90 16/4/2009, 09STATE37566.
91 See Lusane, Clarence, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice: Foreign Policy, Race, and the New American Century 
Santa Barbara, CA Greenwood Publishing Group, , 1².
92 Harmon, Stephen A., Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara-Sahel Region: Corruption, Contraband, Jihad and the 
Mali War of  2012-2013 (London: Routledge, 2016), 137.
93 Bureau of  Public Affairs Department Of  State, ‘Remarks at Signing Ceremony for Millennium 
Challenge Corporation’s Compact with the Republic of  Mali – Secretary Condoleezza Rice and Ambas-
sador Danilovich’, https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/75871.htm (accessed 24 October 
1 Bureau of  Public Affairs Department Of  State. The Office of  Electronic Information, ‘5emarks 
at the Community of  Democracies UNGA Event ²  Secretary Condoleezza 5ice’, 1 October  
https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/10/93344.htm 
94 23/5/2006, 06NIAMEY515
95 11/4/2009, 09STATE35882
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was increased US policy concern about trafficking and slavery passing through Mali.96 
Analysis of  Malian-US relations unveils a conjunction of  factors behind the discursive 
success of  Malian descriptions of  its northern subjects. These include dominant policy 
concerns about global terror and bureaucratic prioritisation practices focusing on 
terror and terror enablers, which had significant effects on diplomatic interactions that 
sought to make sense of  events in terms of  these global factors. This is what enabled 
the subsumption of  many of  Mali’s northern peoples into the global drive against 
terror. This conjunction of  factors was key to these subjects being simply absorbed 
into the knowledge and methods of  the War on Terror, as evidenced in the NIPF 
instructions to American diplomats, rather than being the subject of  a Mali-specific 
decision. To summarise, the policy shift of  2008 was predicated on an absorption of  
Malian representation of  its northern subjects and on the conflict itself. The crucial 
representations that crossed over into the US understanding of  the conflict, despite the 
qualms of  diplomats on the ground, were those of  nomads as opportunistic bandits 
who engaged with terrorists for profit this is how Bahanga was so spectacularly 
depoliticised, and those of  the conflict necessitating a military-first approach, which 
came to be defined as control of  subjects and territory. It is in the context of  knowledge-
production for policy that a discussion or decision specific to Mali might seem less 
necessary than a simple recategorisation of  the Malian issue in terms of  the War on 
Terror. This shift would seem logical only in this specific set of  circumstances, and not 
before late 2008.
This is how Malian representation of  Tuareg subjects and their extremely tenuous 
links to AQIM came to justify a policy shift. This was unnecessary, considering US 
diplomats in Bamako were remarkably well informed. My research on representations 
of  identity in diplomatic knowledge production has found this to be a surprisingly 
common phenomenon. In other words, policymakers can discipline diplomacy’s 
reporting from abroad to see what they prioritise seeing and, of  course, to choose 
what to read and what to believe however, in excess this practice constitutes self-
sabotage. This is not necessarily a failure caused by selective intelligence analysis, such 
as that leading to the Iraq invasion in 2003.97 Rather, this is the result of  practices that 
discipline an institution’s knowledge production. For a Foucaldian IR theorist, this is 
a fascinating example of  epistemological power in practice, for we are witnessing the 
practices that govern, produce, and discipline knowledge. This is far more pervasive 
than ignoring certain reports. This is a process that limits both the writing and the 
reading of  information, resulting in a lack of  essential nuance, context, and detail in 
96 5/11/2009, 09STATE114215
97 Fitzgerald, Michael and Richard Ned Lebow, ‘Iraq: The Mother of  All Intelligence Failures’, Intelligence 
and National Security 1, Ȳ  1 October , 4²99.
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the US policy regarding Mali. Crucially, it created the conditions, including urgency, for 
Malian representations of  the conflict to be more believable—they responded better 
to dominant policy concerns and knowledge-governing practices than the work of  US 
diplomats. Thus it is that through representations of  identity carried in diplomacy that 
Mali obtained unlikely influence over US policy. 
Step 5: Nomads wrapped in terror? Conclusions on Mali regarding strategic 
communications
This paper has expounded a conceptually informed method designed to retrieve how 
diplomatic communication constitutes representations of  subjects, territory, time, 
and politics. Putting this analytical engine to work, it has explored the linguistic and 
discursive topography of  the conflict over the meaning and significance of  Tuareg 
presence, activity, grievances, and insurgency. It has shown the role played by identity-
making in representing people, space, and conflict in US-Malian diplomacy, identifying 
the exact instances when Malian representations of  the conflict came to influence the 
US understanding of  the conflict. Analysis found that the conditions that enabled this 
event were not only contextual, but also pertained to American diplomatic and policy 
priorities and practices instituted during the War on Terror. 
Understanding the role played by the representations of  conflict and of  its context in 
Malian-US relations in the s holds vital lessons. The first lesson is methodological. 
This paper demonstrates the usefulness of  conceptually informed discourse analysis 
methods that pinpoint how reality is constituted in words, comparisons, writing, text, 
and relations among texts. In terms of  policy analysis and research, this means that it is 
worthwhile paying attention to the way representations are constituted. This is relevant 
not only to the practice of  strategic communications, but also to an empirical assessment 
of  its effects, effectiveness, risks, and, particularly, to understanding how they work. In 
other words, it is worth analysing the power of  descriptions that are, ultimately, one 
of  the key ways through which political events can be reported on a page. Methods 
such as the one expounded and applied in this paper, can reveal how words, language, 
comparisons, and associations constitute the ‘reality‘ that informs policy.
Conceptually, this research shows that identity-making in diplomatic communication 
is a powerful and influential aspect of  international relations. Furthermore, it pays 
tribute to the old post-structuralist adage that words, language, and how they constitute 
subjectivity, are of  vital importance in constituting how the world is seen and dealt 
with. Identity, it emerges, is a key aspect of  how the world is understood. More broadly, 
while theories exploring epistemology might seem impenetrable and philosophically 
indulgent, they can yield a greater understanding of  events occurring in the delicate 
conceptual limbo between what is known and how something is known. 
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Two lessons emerge for diplomacy. First, it is worth reading the work of  diplomats on 
the ground in more detail, particularly when resources and effort have been expended to 
make them as well-informed, nuanced, and detailed in their local understanding as the 
American diplomats in Bamako were during the 2000s. In other words, their work went 
unheeded though their advice might have helped avert the disaster of  2012. Second, 
it should be clear that disciplining diplomatic knowledge production to make it useful 
to seemingly more important, immediate, and ‘powerful’ practices, such as intelligence 
and military strategy, can have unintended medium- and long-term consequences. In 
this case, such disciplinary practices made it possible for the northern Malian issue 
to become subsumed in 2008 into the strong categories of  the War on Terror. That 
is, it was a case of  reclassification into the concerns of  the Global War on Terror, its 
assumptions and methods, departing from a more localised understanding of  the issues 
involved. This recategorisation was, of  course, not only born of  Malian diplomacy, it 
depended on the broad and global categories of  the counterterrorism policy of  the 
2000s. This suggests that the very presence of  broad, global policy categories and 
assumptions that can be found at the core of  most government policy is an enabling 
factor for slippages in meaning and precision, which can appear very minor at one level, 
but which can lead to major changes in policy application on the ground. 
For policymaking, this research shows that it can be counterproductive to err too far 
on the side of  focused prioritisation of  information as it is produced and written. This 
creates a self-fulfilling loop where policymakers risk seeing only what they expect to 
see, and other information of  potential importance is discarded as irrelevant. This was 
the case with much of  the detail collected by diplomats on the Tuareg’s grievances, 
their relations with AQIM, and their relevance to the War on Terror. Ultimately, this 
resulted in a lost opportunity to counter extremism, promote peace in northern Mali, 
and destroy AQIM. While diplomacy is not the totality of  information gathering and 
decision-making, it is a site where other knowledge-production and policy practices 
of  government are reflected. This is how this study of  diplomacy was able to take 
into account other institutions, such as the NSC, and their knowledge production, and 
infer that the policy shift went unchallenged in Washington. Further, in terms of  policy 
agency, the heavy dominance of  counterterrorism concerns allowed Mali—as well 
as most north African states—to obtain US assistance which was, conversely, mostly 
invested against old enemies and not against terrorists. This means that while clear policy 
concerns and priorities issued from the top focus minds, they also render policymaking 
vulnerable to representations that resonate with or appear to address these concerns. 
For strategic communications, the lesson is evident: identity-making is crucial to the 
exercise of  communicative influence, and this paper has shown how. The diplomatic 
strategic communications success of  one of  the world’s poorest countries shows that it 
is not always evident who is most susceptible to instrumental approaches to diplomatic 
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communication. Finally, this paper should serve as a warning about the unintended 
consequences of  strategic communications power. The spectacular and unlikely 
strategic communications victory of  Touré’s Malian government obtained a discreet 
but significant reversal of  the American development-first approach to the Sahel. The 
militarisation of  Saharan security initiatives meant that the reversal was accompanied by 
significant military and training assistance to Malian forces, which inevitably came to be 
invested against the Tuareg. 
It would be disingenuous to believe that these diplomatic and policy events did not 
contribute to the staggering MNLA-led Tuareg uprising that followed in early 2012. 
The ‘bandit’ Bahanga, seeking to carve out a ‘trafficking fiefdom’, turned out to be 
deeply committed to the Tuareg cause, and from exile in Libya rallied thousands of  
young recruits and of  veterans of  the 1990 uprising to the MNLA. He was so important 
to the grouping of  various Tuareg clans and individuals into the MNLA rebel alliance 
that his death in August 11 resulted in a significant degradation of  its unity, cohesion, 
core networks, and leadership.98
By late 2012, northern Mali had collapsed into disaster. The uprising by the Tuareg and 
Arab minorities in the north was overtaken by the rapid advance of  Islamic insurgents, 
Ansar Dine, and the AQIM offshoot Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, 
MU-AO. In Bamako, a small group of  officers staged a coup protesting President 
Touré’s failure to hold the country together. Soon the Tuareg were defeated by Ansar 
Dine, AQIM, and MUJAO, leading to a French intervention that only restored the 
problematic status quo ante and caused the exodus of  tens of  thousands of  Tuareg 
into precarious exile across the Sahara. Following its strategic communications triumph, 
Touré’s administration collapsed due to its own success in avoiding the implementation 
of  the Algiers Accords. US policy failed in its goal to combat extremism and came 
to unwittingly facilitate an Islamic takeover, while northern Mali’s problems remain 
unaddressed. Such is the price of  persuasion. 
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